

PARTY AND POLICY IN IMPERIAL BRAZIL¹

[Conference Draft. Not for citation or attribution. Comments welcome:

wrs@ucla.edu]

William R. Summerhill
Department of History, UCLA

The relationship between the Brazil's centralized polity and its relative economic backwardness in the nineteenth century captured the interest of historians since before the overthrow of the Emperor in 1889. Patronage, in the form of using the resources of the central government to award positions and pork as a private payoff for political support, is the most salient example of the link from narrow political interests to economics in Imperial Brazil.² Nonetheless, there has been little work devoted to identifying the interaction between the economy and Brazil's formal political institutions in an era marked by political stability and economic torpor. The politics of patronage involved tax and expenditure policies on the part of the central government that held profound allocative and distributive consequences. These were of special significance in Brazil,

¹ I gratefully acknowledge the support of a U.S. Department of Education Fulbright-Hays Faculty Research Abroad Grant, the National Fellows Program at the Hoover Institution, International Studies and Overseas Programs at UCLA, and the Social Science History Institute at Stanford University. An earlier version benefited from comments from or conversations with David P. Baron, Gary Cox, José Murilo de Carvalho, Scott Desposato, Avner Greif, Stephen Haber, Keith Krehbiel, John Londregan, Nolan McCarty, Jeffrey Mosher, Douglass North, James Robinson, Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, David Samuels, and Barry Weingast, and from the comments of participants at the Conference on Institutions and Markets in Historical Perspective, Stanford; the Fourth International Conference of the Americas, Puebla, Mexico; the All-UC Latin American History meeting at U.C. Davis; and the Social Science History Workshop at Stanford. All errors are mine.

² The imperial era in Brazil runs from 1824 through 1889, during which Brazil was a constitutional monarchy that, in contrast to its republican Spanish American neighbors, enjoyed rather remarkable political stability. This paper focuses on the 1880s, but makes reference more generally to Second Reign Brazil (1840-1889) during which Dom Pedro de Alcântara...de Bragança e Borbon, Emperor Dom Pedro II, ruled as monarch. A richly detailed study of the workings of political patronage in Second Reign Brazil is provided by Graham (1990).

given both the highly centralized division of authority that characterized its polity, and its poor record of economic growth in this period.³ Since regulatory and expenditure policies were elaborated within a well-defined set of political institutions, and clearly delineated organizations (to include party-based cabinets and party affiliations on the floor of the Parliament), they were subject to the influence of Brazilian political organization. This paper reassesses the role of political parties in Imperial Brazil by examining voting patterns on the floor of the lower house of Parliament between 1881 and 1884. The principle finding is that most voting in Deputies in the Chamber divided along party lines, as Deputies hewed to partisan positions. On those occasions when factions split off from parties, local constituent interests over-rode party positions to pull Deputies away from party objectives. However the evidence here shows that factionalization around constituent interests was of second-order importance in policymaking. In light of the findings of this paper, the historiography understates the significance of political parties, especially in transforming cronyism into particular economic policies. Although it is not possible to attribute all of the pattern of party-based voting to the influence of party organizations, parties did command considerable electoral resources that were valued by Deputies. Most importantly, the economic consequences of strong party organizations in the Chamber of Deputies were positive when contrasted with the purely distributive model of policymaking. By acting in concert party partisans adopted measures that were less distortionary than they would have attained by

³ For a detailed discussion of the structure of the Brazilian state under the 1824 constitution, see São Vicente (1857). On the economic consequences of centralized policymaking in general, see Inman and Rubinfeld (1997). The average rate of growth in per capita GDP in Brazil was barely positive over the course of the nineteenth century. For estimates, and a study of the economic factors at work, see Leff (1982).

independently pursuing the politics of the pork barrel. While the magnitude of this effect cannot be stated with any precision, its direction is clear: partisan politics impelled policies that helped offset the negative economic consequences of Brazil's highly centralized division of authority.

This paper examines three questions about the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies, using the early 1880s as a case study. Did Brazilian parties exhibit different voting patterns on the floor of the Chamber of Deputies? Did members of each party cohere, voting with their partisan colleagues? What influence did party affiliation play in explaining the voting records of each individual Deputy relative to individual and constituent characteristics? In answering these questions the paper proceeds in three sections. The first section motivates the study of Brazilian parties in light of the theory of policymaking in legislatures, with special emphasis on the economic significance of partisanship in a distributive-politics setting. The second section turns to the historiographical characterization of Brazilian political parties, by reference to empirical tests of party cohesion and partisan influence on voting outcomes in the Chamber of Deputies. The final section concludes.

Political Parties in Imperial Brazil: History and Theory

Students of Brazilian Imperial politics assign party a secondary role in legislative politics. While most correctly identify both the electoral connection between elite constituents and Deputies, and the influence of Cabinet, in shaping partisanship, most also proclaim such partisanship to have been weak in the Parliament.⁴ To date no studies

⁴ Graham (1990), pp. 149-60, *passim*; Viotti da Costa (1985) pp. 69-72; Barman (1999), pp. 172, 323. For a perspective that argues for the cohesion of parties, but focuses on the socioeconomic origins of partisans

have actually attempted to measure the degree of party cohesion in legislative policymaking, nor searched systematically for other determinants of voting outcomes on the floor of the Chamber of Deputies. Political scientists working in very different historical settings from that of Imperial Brazil, have advanced a variety of explanations for the existence and strength of political parties more generally in detailed studies of nineteenth-century legislatures. These explanations range from the teleological (parties possibly induce equilibrium policy outcomes) to the rational calculus of purely self-interested politicians (parties can provide resources that legislative candidates value, ranging from funds for election campaigns, to party labels that prove useful in providing electoral cues).⁵ Whether parties are strong in a legislature, or not, is a function of two factors. The first of these is the electoral mechanism while the second is whether the parties control resources valuable for the electoral purposes of individual legislators. Low district magnitudes, and winner-take-all-elections, combined with disincentives to intra-party competition for votes, tend to promote strong party organizations.⁶ By adding to those features an exogenous source of campaign resources one has the makings of a very strong party system.

Such features characterize the Brazilian polity in general, and of the 1880s in particular, quite well. Campaign resources, and the fates of political careers, often resided with the Cabinet. Under Brazil's constitutional monarchy cabinets were hand

rather than parties per se, see Carvalho (1996), 374. For recent studies that examine partisanship at its local origins, see Mosher (2000), Bieber (2001) and Needell (2001).

⁵ Aldrich (1995), pp. 40-71, provides a thorough survey on the theoretical origins and consequences of legislative parties.

⁶ Cox and McCubbins (1996), 34-35.

selected by the Emperor, not created by the parliamentary majority.⁷ Since cabinets administered elections, they wielded enormous direct and indirect influence over electoral outcomes. Deputies of the majority party could ill afford to ignore the policy preferences of the cabinet, since the cabinet (comprised of prominent party leaders) commanded critical electoral resources. Moreover, the electoral and re-districting reform that preceded the elections of 1881 returned Brazil to an electoral division of large numbers of single-member districts, as many as twenty in one province. The low district magnitude resulting from this reform reduced tendencies to intra-party competition for votes. Under this system each party would typically field a single candidate in a district, who then faced no competition in the actual election from within their own party, and hence had little reason to set himself apart from the party. These two features --party-based cabinets with influence over elections (thanks to resources they commanded from outside the party), and many small, single-member districts-- gives rise to the hypothesis that political parties in the 1880s were strong, in the sense that they constrained the choices of their members on the floor of the chamber.

Ascertaining the strength of Imperial Brazil's legislative parties is a key concern of the rest of this paper. However, the economic consequences of partisan politics further motivate the examination of partisanship, and are of interest both generally and in the Brazilian setting. The starting point for the analysis is with a class of models that assumes no political parties in a distributive legislative setting.⁸ To garner insights into

⁷São Vicente (1857), pp. 227-256 discusses the constitutional powers granted cabinets in Brazil.

⁸ The base line model here draws on Weingast, et al (1981). Ensuing papers, especially Shepsle and Weingast (1981, and 1984), allowed to a greater degree for partisan influence in pork barrel politics, but still heavily emphasized constituent interests in policy making.

the economic consequences of distributive politics pursued under differing institutional arrangements, the policy outcomes of two different ways of pursuing market interventions may be compared with the benchmark of economic efficiency. The economically efficient policy, one entirely free of politics, is that of standard benefit-cost analysis. An efficient market intervention by government yields a project scale (be it a vector of expenditures and tax rates, or a level of regulation) that maximizes the social surplus given the economy's resources and technology. Two cases of politicized interventions depart from this efficiency criterion by introducing the political "efficiency" concerns of politicians. The first case politicizes in a simple fashion the benefits and costs of a market intervention by the legislature by positing a sole policy maker who is concerned with her level of political support from constituents who enjoy the benefits and bear the costs of policy. For this unitary policymaker, seeking political (re-electoral) support, those public expenditures that go to politically relevant constituents represent not resource costs (as in the efficiency model), but rather political benefits for the politician that provides them. This arrangement thus transforms economic benefits and costs into political benefits and costs (from the perspective of a unitary policy maker), reassigning one component of real resource costs to the benefit side of the political equation, thereby creating an economic distortion. The equilibrium policy intervention in this case exceeds the optimal level, yielding "too much" regulation, or too much public expenditure with a concomitant decrease in the social surplus.

The second political arrangement simply extends this politicization of project benefits and costs by dispensing with the unitary government and partitioning the national territory into a set of administratively-defined electoral districts. Each district

has one legislator selected by the enfranchised constituents. Moreover, these legislators prefer legislative universalism to minimum winning coalitions, and play a “Universal Legislative Game (ULG)” when designing market interventions. Universalism provides each legislator with the certainty that their pet project will be adopted. Policy outcomes in the model are thus omnibus packages guaranteeing each legislator a pork-barrel project. Under these conditions, the policy outcome is a scale of market intervention even greater than that of the first politicized case, which was already beyond the efficient policy. In this case, legislators maximizing their political support (rather than net economic benefits) fail to internalize the negative economic externalities arising from the policies induced by the local interests of their constituents and inflicted on the other legislative districts. The key comparative statics result derived by comparing the two different political arrangements is that the degree of economic inefficiency arising from the legislators’ preferences for market intervention increases with the number of districts.⁹ In a third case, where the legislature operates not on the basis of universalism (guaranteeing each legislator a pet project), but instead prefers the Distributive Legislative Game (DLG) based on minimum winning coalitions, the policy outcome may involve a scale greater than, or less than, that which obtains under universalism, though with some additional restrictions the policy scale is less than that of the universalistic solution.¹⁰

⁹ Weingast et al. (1981) appropriately label this corollary the “Law of 1/N.” As N, the number of districts, increases, the gulf between the efficient policy and equilibrium policy grows. See also Fiorina and Noll (1978).

¹⁰ The conditions under which legislators prefer universalism to minimum winning coalitions (MWC) a particular solution to the “Distributive Legislative Game”, are given in Weingast (1979), while conditions under which legislators prefer MWC to Universalism are given in Fiorina (1981); Ferejohn et al. (1987), Schwartz (1989), and Aldrich (1995). Fiorina (1981) and Ferejohn et al. (1987) further establish the conditions under which the MWC that forms is the one comprised of the least costly array of projects.

A fourth case is developed here. It is a variant of the Distributive Legislative Game where political parties exist, and where parties choose policies based on intra-party universalism. Its key feature is that the majority party, by wielding resources that are politically valuable to legislators, can get members of the majority to account for the negative externalities that their pet projects generate for other members of the majority.¹¹ Consider, for the purposes of illustration, the case of a distributive regulatory policy, adopted as a majority party omnibus, with no expenditures, each element of which concentrates benefits within the respective district, but creates a negative externality in all districts. There are three legislators: legislators I and J comprise the majority party, and legislator K is the minority. The economically efficient level or scope of regulation, x^E , maximizes:

$$E(x) = \mathbf{b}(x) - \sum_i^k c(x)_{3i}$$

where x is the project scale, scope, or degree of regulation, B represents gross economic benefits from the regulatory policy and C_{3i} are the costs arising from the regulatory policy, here simplified to be negative economic externalities partitioned by legislative district. Under the Universal Legislative Game (ULG), each legislator chooses a level of regulation that maximizes his political benefits, focusing only on intra-district costs, yielding x^N , which maximizes:

$$N_i^{ULG}(x) = \mathbf{b}_i(x) - c_{3i}(x)$$

¹¹ Shepsle and Weingast (1981) briefly discuss the possibility of universalism within the majority party in place of universalism within the legislature as a whole. But by defining parties as “legislative parties,” they use the example to further strengthen the case for full-blown universalism. The key difference with the model elaborated here is the existence of politically valuable resources resources wielded by party leaders, but not under the control of majority party members.

In the case of the Distributive Legislative Game (DLG) with intra-party universalism, members of the majority party select x^{MAJ} , which maximizes the intra-party political benefits of each member of the majority, while taking into account the economic externality inflicted by the policy on other members of the majority:

$$N_i^{DLG}(x) = \mathbf{b}_i(x) - c_{3i}(x) + \alpha[-c_{3j}(x)]$$

where α is a parameter indicating party strength, which can take on a value ranging from zero (completely ineffective party) to one (perfectly effective party). Let a “strong party system” mean that the majority party succeeds in completely internalizing the externalities arising from the distributive regulatory policy and that are borne by the districts of majority partisans from the distributive regulatory policy. In the case where the party system is “strong”, α equals one, and the political maximand for majority legislators becomes:

$$\mathbf{b}_i(x) - [c_{3i}(x) + c_{3j}(x)]$$

For purely distributive regulatory legislation, Figure 0 shows that the policy selected under the majority party game exceeds the efficient level, but is less than or equal to that selected by a universalistic legislature, depending on the strength of the party system.

Thus,

$$x^N \geq x^{MAJ} > x^E$$

and only under special circumstances (such as when the majority party includes all legislators and completely internalizes the externalities of the policy, or when there are no negative externalities for other districts from a particular policy) will the strong-party

solution and universalistic solution be both equal and efficient.¹² Generally the scale of regulation is closer to the efficient level and the social surplus will be greater than that created by universalistic regulation.

In short, attenuating the distortionary and dissipative scenario involving unbridled universalism is any feature that reduces the de facto (if not the de jure) number of districts in the legislature. Political parties that internalize the negative externalities arising from unfettered political self-interest seeking on the part of individual legislators serve that purpose. If the majority party, by wielding electoral resources valued by legislators, induces its members to take into consideration the political benefits and costs of market interventions to other members of the party it reduces the inefficiency of the market intervention. While this leaves the de jure number of legislative districts intact, it effectively reduces them insofar as their number impacts the scale of the market intervention. In the case where politicians pursue policies in response not only to constituent interests, but also partisan concerns, the policy outcome is somewhere between that of the first political arrangement sketched above (the unitary polity), and the second (a purely distributive legislature). The policy consequence of going from a non-partisan legislature to one with strong parties is a movement of the scale of the market intervention from the extreme case of pure pork in the direction of economic efficiency. Strong legislative parties, when they exist, can limit the allocative inefficiency of market interventions by providing incentives for partisans to account better for the externalities generated in distributed pork-barrel projects.

¹² It should be noted that the result requires an additional condition to hold in the case of expenditure policies, which create an additional negative political externality via taxes, and sometimes an additional positive political externality via project expenditures received in districts of other members of the majority.

In summary, Brazil's political parties in the 1880s are good candidates for "strong party" status. There were two main reasons for this. The first was the electoral reform of 1881, which among other changes created single-member electoral districts throughout Brazil. All else being equal, single-member districts reduce the incentives for politicians to cultivate a personalistic base of electoral support, and relying more on party labels and party organizations to aid them in getting elected (Cox and McCubbins, 1996). Second, and likely more important, was the existence of party-based electoral resources exogenous to legislators in the Chamber of Deputies. Specifically, party leaders could influence, at times quite dramatically, the election and re-election prospects of a Deputy. This was due to two features: party-based Cabinets that were heavily insulated from the Party's legislators, and Cabinet influence over elections. Under the Brazilian Constitution, cabinets were not selected by the victorious Chamber majority in the wake of elections. Rather, they were selected by the Emperor. Moreover, Cabinets did not automatically fall in a no-confidence vote. Instead the Emperor decided whether the Cabinet would be replaced, or whether instead the Chamber of Deputies would be dismissed with the Cabinet organizing new elections. Cabinets in turn wielded several instruments of influence in elections, most importantly the authority to appoint provincial executives who could head the Party's electoral machine in each province. As a result, the Cabinet had substantial power to reward and punish defectors from the majority party.

Party and Voting on the Floor of the Chamber of Deputies

Parties were apparent in Brazilian legislative politics from the 1840s onward. By the 1870s there were two well-defined parties, Liberals and Conservatives. The parties

disagreed on numerous policy issues, the most fundamental of which was the appropriate division of authority between the central government and the provinces. Other issues arose that did not cleanly separate legislators by party positions, and historians have interpreted the appearance of such issues as an indicator of the relative unimportance of parties. Figure 9 provides a stylized portrayal of the main political divisions by the 1870s, based on Murilo de Carvalho's interpretation of the politics of the era, one which assigns more importance to party identity (though not party organizations) than most historians have assigned.

The evidence used to examine the role of political parties in policy outcomes is the roll-call voting records of the 18th Legislature (1881-1884).¹³ The published debates for these years contain 41 roll call votes taken on the floor of the Chamber. Such a data set is extraordinarily small by the standards of scholars working on legislatures in the U.S. or U.K. It nonetheless permits the clear identification of patterns of voting, both by party, and for individual legislators. The substance of these roll calls includes disputes over the seating of individual deputies for electoral reasons, proposed taxes and subsidies, and several confidence votes in various cabinets.¹⁴ During the 18th Legislature, the majority Liberals held 78 of the 122 seats, and the Conservatives held the balance.¹⁵ The sessions from 1881 through 1884 were marked by considerable conflict and instability, as

¹³ These were extracted from Brazil (various years), and I believe represent this population of roll calls for these years. The roll calls are only incompletely indexed, and thus required a page-by-page search in the Brazilian parliamentary debates to find them all.

¹⁴ Summerhill (2000) provides a detailed list and description of the roll call votes.

¹⁵ See Javari (1889), 378, for the party totals and breakdown by province.

several cabinets fell to no-confidence votes, and the emancipation of slaves over 60 years of age became a major policy question in the Chamber.¹⁶

Attempting to identify the influence of party in roll-call voting outcomes raises thorny analytic and interpretive issues. Although students of legislative politics frequently invoke the importance of party in empirical work, present theory and method do not permit a definitive test of party strength.¹⁷ Indeed, since the conventional tests for party cohesion yield measures that are observationally equivalent to an absence of party discipline (under some fairly weak assumptions), one cannot on the basis of roll-call voting patterns alone make an argument for the influence of party. Rather, party influence must be inferred, with less strength than might be hoped for, from both quantitative and qualitative evidence.

As an empirical point of departure it is important to establish first whether party is a reasonable candidate for explaining roll call voting outcomes in light of the available evidence. Three different tests provide insights to the relationship between party affiliation and voting patterns on the floor of the Chamber of Deputies. The first of these measures is the index of likeness.¹⁸ It gauges the extent to which the two parties took similar positions on each roll call vote. Figure 1 presents the index on each of 41 roll calls taken in the 18th Legislature, between 1881 and 1884.

[Insert Figure 1 About Here]

¹⁶ The politics of this period are detailed in Colson (1979), and with special emphasis on the emancipation question, by Conrad (1972).

¹⁷This point is made convincingly by Krehbiel (1999) and Krehbiel (2000).

¹⁸ See Anderson, et al. (1966), pp. 44-45.

The index of likeness, while displaying some variability, strongly suggests that there were fundamental differences between Liberals and Conservatives by the time a question was voted on the floor of the Chamber. The vast majority of the divisions reveal low levels of similarity between the two parties. In only one of the roll calls were the Liberals and Conservatives quite similar. In this instance the result is largely artificial; a large number of Liberals boycotted the vote, in an apparent attempt to deny the Chamber a quorum. Of those remaining, several sided with the Conservatives, giving rise to an unusually strong similarity between the parties when it came to the actual floor vote.¹⁹ Whether the typical difference between the Liberals and Conservatives was a result of the influence of their respective parties, or whether party affiliation itself was a result of their constituent interests or ideological positions, cannot be determined from the index.²⁰ Nonetheless, in their overall voting patterns, the parties were not as indistinguishable as some historians claim. On the contrary their differences were quite apparent.

A second test examines the degree of cohesiveness of each party. The measure employed to indicate the degree of cohesion among partisans is the Rice index, and its interpretation is straightforward.²¹ The greater the proportion of legislators from a party who vote together, the higher that party's Rice score. Figure 2 presents the Rice index for Liberals and Conservatives across the 41 roll call votes.

[INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]

¹⁹ A chi-square test for the strength of the association between Party and a deputy's vote on each roll call proved to be significant for every roll call except this same one.

²⁰ This because it suffers from precisely the problems identified by Krehbiel (2000).

²¹ see Anderson, et al., (1966), pp. 32-40. For a discussion of the use of indices of cohesion in other historical settings, see Cox (1987), pp. 21-31.

While on average the minority Conservatives enjoyed greater cohesion than the majority party, cohesion for each party was typically high. Liberals suffered greater defections, but still exhibited an index of cohesion greater than 0.5 on more than 75 percent of the roll calls. Combined with the index of likeness, the Rice index supports the view that the parties were quite different from each other, while enjoying appreciable unity within each party.

A third test extends the first two by applying factor analysis to the roll call votes to first establish the major policy issues, or dimensions of conflict, and then to plot each deputy on those dimensions.²² It then tests a variety of determinants of each deputy's position, to include party, personal characteristics, and constituent characteristics. For the 41 roll calls from the 18th Legislature, one dimension of conflict accounts for nearly 60 percent of the common variance among the votes cast by deputies, while a second dimension accounts for another five or so percent of the variance, and additional dimensions account for less still.²³ Figure 3 presents the unrotated factor loading plot for the roll calls, which by and large exhibits the desired pattern of roll calls lumping together on each end of the horizontal axis.

[INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE]

Figure 4 plots each deputy on the two most important factors, each of which represents an issue or dimension of conflict, much like a simple left-right political continuum. Visual inspection is sufficient to infer that party affiliation is closely related

²² A variety of techniques are available for the estimate; see Anderson et al. (1966), pp. 123-174; Poole and Rosenthal (1985); and Heckman and Snyder (1997). Here I use the standard principal components version of factor analysis.

²³ Greater detail on the results of the factor analysis are in Summerhill (2000).

to each deputy's policy position on the first dimension, since the Conservatives cluster to the left of the horizontal axis, while Liberals cluster to the right, and exhibit virtually no overlap.²⁴

[INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE]

While party affiliation is closely related to the first dimension, the second dimension holds no such simple interpretation, since deputies from both parties are intermingled on the vertical axis. Regression analysis provides greater insight on the apparent strength of party on the first dimension, and also allows an exploration of whether there were systematic determinants of the deputies' positions on the second dimension. Figure 5 presents the results of OLS regression where the dependent variable is a deputy's score on the first dimension, and the independent variables either capture or proxy party, occupational background, electoral strength, and constituent interests in the critical issue of the era, which was slavery.

[INSERT FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE]

The quantitative results are wholly consistent with the qualitative picture that emerges in Figure 4. Moreover, they indicate that using party affiliation to sort Deputies on the fundamental dimension of conflict raises little risk of ignoring other important factors. Party affiliation, far more than any other variable, accounts for each deputy's position on the first issue. Most of the occupational variables fail to take on any statistical significance at all. The defining feature of conflict on the first, and most important dimension was partisan affiliation.

²⁴There may be a regional basis to the first dimension as well, though it is not completely clear. A regression of Deputies' positions on Party and provincial dummies leave the Party effect intact, but reveals three non-contiguous provinces to have been systematically more "liberal" than accounted for by Party alone.

Figure 6 provides an identical analysis for the deputies on the second dimension of conflict, but yields very different results.

[INSERT FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE]

Consistent with Figure 4, party affiliation plays no role whatsoever in the deputies' respective positions on the second dimension. Nor do any of the occupational variables. The only two variables that take on statistical significance are a province-wide measure of constituent interest in slavery (the number of slaves per elector in the province), and the margin by which the deputy won his last election.²⁵ Although the magnitude of the effect is small, the results indicate that the second dimension was some combination of direct constituent interest in the slavery question, and the electoral "slack" or "cushion" enjoyed by the deputy.

The results of the three tests here are suggestive: voting on the floor was usually consistent with the party affiliation of deputies. As already stated, such tests are not definitive, because apparent party voting can have two distinct components: party discipline imposed by party organizations and leaders with the ability to command and confer resources valued by Deputies, and the selection effect, whereby Deputies that are already partisan in response to their constituents' interests, or personal ideology, sort themselves into two parties. None of the tests above can cleanly distinguish between these two possibilities. Figure 7 takes the analysis one step further. It simultaneously estimates each Deputy's position on the first dimension, and their party affiliation, using instrumental variables. The final two-stage least squares estimates can only be used with caution, since the underpinning predicted values for Party and Score manifest precarious

²⁵ See the note to Figure 5 for the sources of this information.

statistical significance. However, the results are encouraging, showing that Party exercised an appreciable effect on the Deputies' placement along the first dimension, with constituency interest in slavery playing only a small role.

Two additional tests buttress the finding that Party was a critical determinant of voting outcomes—even on seemingly less-than-partisan distributive issues--by reference to two roll calls that should have been of great salience to Deputies' home constituents because of their geographically distributive character. The first of these was the confidence vote that brought down the Liberal Dantas Cabinet in July of 1884. The no-confidence motion was the last in a series provoked by the Cabinet's efforts to pass legislation freeing geriatric slaves. Not only Conservatives –traditionally allied with the slave-owning class—opposed the legislation. Key Liberals from areas with higher concentrations of slaves defected from the Cabinet, opposing the emancipation initiative, and supporting the no-confidence position.²⁶ Nonetheless, partisan identity provides the stronger of the factors underpinning the vote. Figure 10 presents the results of a Logit analysis of the Deputies' votes on the confidence measure. It takes into account two determinants of Deputies' positions on Dantas. The first is each Deputy's score on the partisan dimension of conflict, while the second their score on the second dimension, best characterized as their position on the question of abolition. Though both factors play a role, partisanship registers as the more important determinant, and adding the second dimension score provides little improvement in the classification of votes.

Figure 11 provides a similar analysis on another largely distributive issue from the same month. A proposal to apply a tax to land near railroads made it to the floor of the

²⁶ Conrad (1972), pp. 210-222, provides detail on the tribulations of both the Dantas ministry and the legislative project.

Chamber, but was defeated. The winners from such legislation would have been constituents from districts that had not enjoyed transport improvements in the preceding decades, while the losers would be landowners that had enjoyed rising land values as a result of the cheap transportation made possible by steam locomotion. The simple principle-agent framework underpinning constituent interest-based voting leads to a prediction that higher levels of railroad capital in a region should be associated with lower levels of support for the land tax measure. Figure 11 regresses the vote results on the partisanship scores, and on the amount of government subsidized railroad capital per elector in each province. The finding that levels of railroad capital provide no improvement whatsoever to the classification of votes, while partisanship correctly classifies nearly 90 percent of them, reveals that political interest was deeply embedded in partisan politics in a way that went beyond narrowly distributive concerns.

While there is ample reason to believe that both party organizations and constituent interests were at work in explaining the partisan pattern of voting, evidence outside the roll calls suggest that the party discipline model quite likely proved dominant in Brazil by 1881. It is indisputable that Conservatives and Liberals differed greatly in their viewpoints about the appropriate role of government, the division of authority between central and provincial levels of administration, and the future course of policy, as exhibited in the party platforms and statements of principles.²⁷ As such, party affiliation depended partly on a form of ideological/constituent interest sorting on the part of individual deputies. Yet party organizations, thanks to the inevitable party identity of the Cabinet, also wielded tremendous electoral influence. This influence was of much

²⁷ Melo (1979).

more proximate concern for the typical deputy than a statement of principles adopted, as in the case of the Conservative Party, decades earlier. Thus, by 1881 the three features of the polity identified and discussed above that give rise to strong parties were all in place in Brazil. Relatively small, single-member electoral districts, the cohesive nature of intra-party voting, the influence of partisan cabinets, and the observed differences between members of the two parties on roll call votes, point to the conclusion that Brazil enjoyed strong parties while still allowing for factional, constituent-driven departures from a pure party model. More importantly, especially in a highly centralized polity, policymaking in the context of strong parties created fewer economic distortions than if the Chamber had operated in a non-partisan yet pork-barrel manner.

CONCLUSION

In light of the results reported here it is no longer possible to dismiss the policy influence of the political parties of Imperial Brazil. The early 1880's provides ample evidence that the Liberal and Conservative parties differed from each other in their voting behavior, and also exhibited a high degree of intra-party coherence. Nonetheless, rejecting the received wisdom does not mean that its polar opposite was true by default. This is because party strength is not a dichotomous variable, but rather a continuous one, which no doubt varied in its importance, both within specific legislatures and across sessions.²⁸

The finding that political parties were influential in securing policy outcomes, while novel in the Brazilian setting, barely scratches the surface of the tremendous body

²⁸ A conjecture that remains to be investigated, but that is consistent with features of the Brazilian case, is that earlier episodes of multi-member electoral districts weakened party discipline in the Chamber.

of issues that remains to be investigated. Doing so will necessarily require reference to both the choice-theoretic tools of positive political economy, and new evidence culled from primary sources. By neglecting to undertake analyses informed by choice theoretic methods and theory and systematic empirical work, historians of Brazilian politics failed to identify the salient dimensions of policy conflict in the Chamber, the relative importance of those dimensions at different points in time, and the underpinning pattern of party voting. Indeed, in contrast to historiographical characterizations, Imperial Brazil's parties cohered, albeit imperfectly, and differed from each other on the fundamental dimensional of policy making. As such Brazilian political history, its pervasive politics of patronage, and the accompanying economic consequences can no longer be understood without closer attention to the politics of parties.

REFERENCES

- Aldrich, John H. Why Parties? (Chicago, 1995).
- Anderson, Lee F., Meredith W. Watts, Jr., and Allen R. Wilcox. Legislative Roll-Call Analysis (Evanston, 1966).
- Barman, Roderick J. Citizen Emperor Pedro II and the Making of Brazil, 1825-1891 (Stanford, 1999)
- Bieber, Judy. "A 'Visão do Sertão:' Party Identity and Political Honor in Late Imperial Minas Gerais, Brazil," HAHR vol. 81, no 2 (2001).
- Brazil. Câmara dos Deputados. Anais da Câmara dos Deputados (Rio de Janeiro, various years).
- Carvalho, José Murilo de. A Construção da Ordem and Teatro de Sombras (Rio de Janeiro, 1996)
- Colson, Roger Frank. The Destruction of a Revolution Polity, Economy and Society in Brazil, 1750-1895 (PhD. Diss., Princeton University, 1979)
- Conrad, Robert Edgar. The Destruction of Brazilian Slavery, 1850-1888 (Berkeley, 1972)
- Costa, Emilia Viotti da. The Brazilian Empire (Chicago, 1985)
- Gary Cox W., The Efficient Secret: the Cabinet and the Development of Political Parties in Victorian England (Cambridge UK 1987)
- Cox, Gary W. and Matthew D. McCubbins, "Structure and Policy: The Institutional Determinants of Policy Outcomes," ms., 1996.
- Ferejohn, John, Morris Fiorina, and Richard D. McKelvey, "Sophisticated Voting and Agenda Independence in the Distributive Politics Setting," American Journal of Political Science 31 (1987): 169-193.
- Fiorina, Morris P., "Universalism, Reciprocity, and Distributive Policymaking in Majority Rule Institutions," Research in Public Policy Analysis and Management 1 (1981): 197-221.
- Fiorina, Morris P., and Roger G. Noll, "Voters, Bureaucrats, and Legislators: A Rational Choice Perspective on the Growth of Bureaucracy," Journal of Public Economics 9 (1978): 239-54
- Graham, Richard. Patronage and Politics in Nineteenth-Century Brazil (Stanford, 1990).

- Heckman, James J. and James M. Snyder, Jr, "Linear Probability Models of the Demand for Attributes with an Empirical Application to Estimating the Preferences of Legislators," RAND Journal of Economics 28 (1997): S142-S189.
- Inman, Robert P. and Daniel L. Rubinfeld, "The Political Economy of Federalism," chap. in Dennis C. Mueller, ed., Perspectives on Public Choice (Cambridge, UK, 1997).
- Javari, Jorge João Dodsworth, Barão de. Organizações e Programas Ministeriais. (Rio de Janeiro, 1889)
- Krehbiel, Keith, "Paradoxes of Parties in Congress," Legislative Studies Quarterly 24 (1999): 31-64.
- _____. "Party Discipline and Measures of Partisanship," American Journal of Political Science 44 (2000): 212-227.
- Leff, Nathaniel H. Underdevelopment and Development in Brazil (London, 1982)
- Melo, Americo Brasiliense de Almeida e. Os Programas dos Partidos e o Segundo Imperio (Brasilia, 1979)
- Mosher, Jeffrey C. "Political Mobilization, Party Ideology, and Lusophobia in Nineteenth-Century Brazil: Pernambuco, 1822-1850," HAHR vol 80, no. 4 (2000).
- Needell, Jeffrey D. "Party Formation and State-Making: The Conservative Party and the Reconstruction of the Brazilian State, 1831-1840." HAHR vol 81, no 2 (2001).
- Pang, Eul-Soo. In Pursuit of Honor and Power (Tuscaloosa, 1988)
- Poole, Keith T. and Howard Rosenthal, "A Spatial Model for Legislative Roll Call Analysis," American Journal of Political Science 29 (1985): 357-384.
- _____, "Congress and Railroad Regulation: 1874 to 1887," chap. In Claudia Goldin and Gary D. Libecap, eds., The Regulated Economy: A Historical Approach to Political Economy (Chicago, 1994).
- São Vicente, Jose Antônio Pimenta Bueno, Marquês de. Direito Publico Brasileiro e Analyse da Constituição do Imperio (Rio de Janeiro, 1857)
- Schwartz, Thomas. "Why Parties?" (Research memorandum, UCLA, 1989).
- Shepsle, Kenneth A. and Barry R. Weingast. "Political Preferences for the Pork Barrel: A Generalization," American Journal of Political Science 25 (1981): 96-111.

_____. "Political Solutions to Market Problems," American Political Science Review 78 (1984): 417-35.

Summerhill, W.R. "Party, Faction, and Policy in Imperial Brazil," Stanford University, 2000.

Weingast, Barry R. "A Rational Choice Perspective on Congressional Norms," American Journal of Political Science 23 (1979): 245-262.

Weingast, Barry R., Kenneth A. Shepsle, and Christopher Johnsen. "The Political Economy of Benefits and Costs: A Neoclassical Approach to Distributive Politics," Journal of Political Economy 89 (1981): 642-664.